The New York Times dated Nov 20, 2008 published a news item (due to William J Broad and David E Sanger) which mentioned that according to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Iran has made 630 kilograms of low-enriched uranium. Several experts are reported to believe that this fissile material may be sufficient for producing a nuclear weapon.
It brings into bold relief the failure of the international community to conclude a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMTC). It is time to recollect why and how a FMTC has failed so far to see the light of the day.
There are two pragmatic ways to curb nuclear weapons madness. One is an effective Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) which has been hanging fire since 1996. The other one is Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), which is yet to be negotiated. Underlying logic of both the treaties is straightforward. CTBT will put a halt on all test explosions of nuclear weapons, and thus will prevent development of fresh weapons, and stall attempts to upgrade the existing ones. FMCT will slash the jugular of the nuclear monster. It will prevent production of the enriched uranium and plutonium without which a nuclear device cannot be produced.
The UN General Assembly’s resolution UNGA 12/1148 of Nov 14, 1957 called for “the cession of the production of fissionable materials for weapon purposes”. Since then, more than fifty years have rolled by, and we have yet to see any thing like a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) coming into being.
Presently, the world is awash with uranium and plutonium, the two well-known fissile materials. It is estimated there exist globally about 1600 tons of highly-enriched uranium and 500 tons of plutonium. If an FMCT sees the light of the day soon, all this uranium and plutonium will become legally incapable of being used for producing nuclear warheads.
FMCT has a depressing history. President Clinton, in his historic address to the UN General Assembly in September 1993 called for a multinational treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear warheads. Within two months the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution calling for a "non-discriminatory, multilateral and international effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices." On March 23, 1995 the Conference on Disarmament (CD) set up a mandate committee to organize discussions on FMCT.
There are many roadblocks to the conclusion of the FMCT. One is lack of consensus as to what the cutoff date should be. This was one of the chief reasons why the negotiations were stalled in 1995. USA and Russia are of the view that the existing stocks of fissile materials should not be covered by an FMCT. In other words the cutoff date should be from the date the FMCT enters into force. China is of the view that future negotiations on FMCT should not involve the issue of stockpiles. Generally, the position of the Nuclear Weapons States is that an FMCT should not get involve itself with the stock of their fissile material before it enters into force.
Pakistan, however, is very keen that the existing stocks should be taken into consideration, and the cutoff date should be fixed retrospectively. Pakistan feels that unless it is done, the nuclear power balance in South Asia will be disturbed. They believe, unless FMCT fixes a cutoff date retroactively, the recent Indo-American Civil Co-operation Agreement will allow India to import nuclear fuel for its civilian reactors and India will be able to use its indigenously produced fissile material for its nuclear weapons. There is a legitimate fear in the minds of many that if the existing stocks are not taken into consideration, it is possible, a few of the nuclear weapon states might show the future production of fissile material as being the stock before the cutoff date. An FMCT without a proper verification mechanism is likely to be ineffective.
Another major difficulty in the conclusion of the FMCT is the definition of fissile material. There is a host of ways to define it. Some of them are:
a) International Panel on Fissile Material defines them as the material that can sustain an explosive fission chain reaction. Under it falls highly enriched uranium or plutonium of almost any isotopic composition description.
b) The United States defines fissile material as "(i) Plutonium except plutonium whose isotopic composition includes 80 percent or greater plutonium-238 (ii) Uranium containing a 20 percent or greater enrichment in the isotopes uranium-233 or uranium-235, separately or in combination or in (iii) any material that contains the material defined in (i) or (ii) above."
c) Russia defines the fissile material as “weapon-grade uranium and plutonium for the purposes of nuclear weapons”.
d) Italy used the definition "plutonium and/or highly enriched uranium enriched over 20 percent U235".
e) IAEA defines fissile material as “plutonium 239, uranium 233 and uranium enriched in the isotopes 235 or 233.
The originally proposed FMCT did not envisage inclusion of tritium in the list of fissile materials. Tritium is a radioactive isotope of hydrogen and has half-life of twelve years, and is used to boost the destructive power of explosive device. Some people think it should be included in the list of fissile materials.
Yet another bone of contention has been how to verify the compliance of FMCT. On January 25, 1994, CD appointed a Special Coordinator, Gerald Shannon of Canada, to organize appropriate arrangements for negotiating the Treaty. Shanon produced in March 1995 what has come to be known as the Shannon Mandate. According to the Mandate an ad hoc committee will be responsible for all negotiations and would settle all the issues. The Shannon Mandate was agreed to consensually and was even acted upon for a few days in the summer of 1998. Many diplomats felt that the consensus behind the Shannon Mandate was real, and fruitful negotiations could take place under it. But Bush Administration threw a spanner in the works by rejecting in 2004 the Shannon Mandate’s concept of international verification. The USA tried to sweeten its rejection by pledging its continued support for negotiating an FMCT. In order to reinforce its sincerity, it even tabled a draft mandate and draft treaty.
On March 23, 2007 a draft decision FCD/2007/L1 was put before the CD. It provides for “negotiations, without any preconditions, on a non-discriminatory multilateral treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.” Almost all the delegates were agreeable to the draft decision L1, except China, Iran and Pakistan. They wanted discussions for any future FMCT to be conducted under Shannon Mandate.
The states likely to be affected by an FMCT are the nuclear weapon states, both recognized and unrecognized, as well as those states, like Japan, Canada and Australia who produce large amount of fissile material for peaceful purposes. It has been often said that FMCT is now ripe for serious negotiations, and the encouraging fact is that no country has openly opposed the raison d’etre of the treaty.
Heart of the problem is to design an FMCT which will stop the production of fissile materials in the hands of the nuclear weapon states, both recognized and unrecognized, and yet leave sufficient scope for the production of such material in the hands of non-nuclear states for peaceful purposes. There is transparent dragging of feet by the nuclear weapon states. They have been doing so under one pretext or the other. There is no other option for the civilized world than to conclude a FMCT as early as possible.
No comments:
Post a Comment