Asif Ali Zardari, the Pakistani president, said on Jan 22, 2008 that Pakistan was willing to consider No First Use (NFU) of the nuclear weapons. It is cheerful news for the people of South Asian region. India and China already stand committed to NFU. If Zardari can really maneuver an authentic, categorical declaration of NFU by the Pakistani establishment, as India and China have done, it will immensely boost political stability in South Asia.
The concept of NFU has pre-eminent place in the fabric of nuclear disarmament. Implication of NFU vis-à-vis non nuclear states is straightforward and simple. All the nuclear weapon states have made that commitment. Their commitment echoes in the Security Council’s Resolution on Security Assurances (no 984 dated 11 April 1995). It will be extremely wicked on the part of a nuclear weapon state to nuke a country which cannot retaliate in kind. The only examples in the history are Hiroshima and Nagasaki. But that was more than half a century ago. Times have changed now, and no government of a civilized country can now even think of doing so, whatever be the provocation. People of no country will endorse their country dropping atomic bombs on the civilian population of any country.
If all the nuclear weapon states decide not to be the first to use their nuclear weapons, there will not be any use of having a nuclear weapon. The logic of having a nuclear weapon is based on the perceived vulnerability of the countries having it. A country, say X, feels that unless it has a nuclear weapon capacity, it might be open to invasion by another country, say Y, who has a nuclear arsenal. So X starts getting into the business of making the nuclear bombs. This happened in the case of Pakistan. In the wake of first Indian nuclear test explosion in 1974, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the then Pakistani Prime Minister said, “If India builds the bomb we will eat grass or leaves, we will go hungry. But we will get one of our own.” Similarly, India’s nuclear program was initiated after China test-exploded it first atomic bomb in 1964 at Lop Nur. The sad fact of South Asia is that the hostility between China and India on one hand, and India and Pakistan on the other has become an emotional fixation. India feels insecure vis-à-vis China. Hence it needs nuclear weapons. Pakistan feels insecure vis-à-vis India. Hence, it needs nuclear weapons. The political situation between India and Pakistan has been colored by the baggage of Kashmir which both the countries having been carrying since they got independence from the British in 1947. For the similar reasons there falls the shadow of Sino-Indian war of 1962, whenever talks of rapprochement between China and India are held.
Simplistically, China and India should not be afraid of an unprovoked nuclear assault from each other. Both of them are categorically and publicly committed to NFU of their nuclear weapons. Both are respected members of international community and adhere to the norms of International Law. It is highly unlikely they should go back on their commitment. This may appear a naïve view to the cynical. However, there are political reasons why a nuclear exchange between Indian and China is unlikely. China need not attack India with nuclear weapons, as it is much superior to India in terms of conventional military prowess. And India will not make the first nuclear strike against China for the fear of massive retaliation. Then why are India and China wasting their resources in upgrading and developing its nuclear arsenal? In case of India, the answer lies in (a) the ambiguity of the Pakistani nuclear doctrine, and (b) the Pakistan’s neurotic obsession with Kashmir. In case of China, the reason lies its infatuation with the dream of becoming a topmost military power in the world.
In case of the United Kingdom and France, nuclear weapons provide a visible basis for their big power status. Both of these two countries are permanent members of the Security Council of the United Nations and wield veto powers. But for the historical reason that they were the major players in the Second World War, they do not have any raison d’etre of having the status they have. Economically, they are on a less sure footing than Japan and Germany. It is quite possible that their place in a reconstructed scheme of Security Council might be called in question.
The UK and France do not have NFU in their nuclear doctrine.
The UK does not have it because politically it is a wartime and peacetime ally of the United States. To have NFU policy, when the USA does not have it, will be antithetical to its overall alliance with the USA. On February 2, 2003, during the TV program BBC Breakfast with Frost, the British defense secretary Geoff Hoon said, “We've always made it clear that we would reserve the right to use our nuclear weapons in conditions of extreme national self defense and that remains our position and that is the position that has been set out consistently by government ministers.”
France also does not believe in NUF doctrine. It wants to retain its right to use nuclear weapons in unspecified hypothetical situations. On January 19, 2006 speaking at the nuclear submarine base L’ille Longue in Brittany, President Jaques Chirac said that France reserves the right to use non-conventional weapons against “leaders of states who would launch a terrorist attack against France.” The real reason for the French not having NFU doctrine in their nuclear policy is their obsession with what they believe to be their fiercely eminent place in the community of nations.
The Russian nuclear doctrine has gone through many changes. The erstwhile Soviet Union had declared in 1982 the NFU to be the basis of their nuclear doctrine. However, the Russians rejected it in 1993, and in the year 2000 they declared that they reserve the right to use nuclear weapons in response to a large scale conventional aggression. Technically it violates the Security Council’s resolution of 1995 on Security Assurances, because the country launching a large scale invasion may be a non-nuclear weapon country. The recent decision of the USA to position its missile defense shield in Poland is presently a cause of annoyance to the Russian administration. General Anatoly Nogovitsyn said recently that Poland’s acceptance of American missile interceptor base exposes the ex-communist nation to attack, possibly by nuclear weapons. He added that Russia’s military doctrine sanctions the use of nuclear weapons against the allies of countries having nuclear weapons if they in some way help them.
USA, the most heavily armed nuclear weapon state, does not have NFU as a part of its nuclear doctrine. They have commitments to defend their NATO allies, Japan and South Korea. NFU may bind their hands in a number of hypothetical situations, and understandably they will not like to get themselves into a nuclear straitjacket. Their Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations dated 15 March 2005 says that the United States does not make positive statements defining the circumstances under which it would use nuclear weapons. The Cinton administration was non-committal on the question of whether the nuclear weapons would be used to address the problem of chemical and biological warfare, or even using them in case of conventional armed conflicts. But it was tacitly assumed that they would not waste their nuclear assets unless the very existence of American nation came under serious threat.
American view seems to be that nuclear weapons, by themselves, do not pose a problem. Real problem is under whose control they are. Nuclear assets with the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China and India are fine. What is worrisome their being with Pakistan, or (potentially) with fundamentalist regimes like Iran. In order to deal with any situation involving the rogue states using nuclear weapons, the USA does not want to commit itself to NFU.
NFU is an intensely ethical concept. If all the nuclear weapon states agree not to be the first to use their nuclear weapons, it will be a step in the direction of eventual nuclear disarmament. Often it may come in clash with the national interest of a nuclear weapon state which swears by it. In spite of a large number of ifs and buts and hypothetical infirmities NFU will prevent nuclear wars and bring the world closer to nuclear disarmament. It is bound to strengthen the non-proliferation regime. NFU is a very strong political commitment and if all the nuclear weapons states make it an integral element of their nuclear doctrine it will go long way to usher a nuclear-weapon-free world.
The concept of NFU has pre-eminent place in the fabric of nuclear disarmament. Implication of NFU vis-à-vis non nuclear states is straightforward and simple. All the nuclear weapon states have made that commitment. Their commitment echoes in the Security Council’s Resolution on Security Assurances (no 984 dated 11 April 1995). It will be extremely wicked on the part of a nuclear weapon state to nuke a country which cannot retaliate in kind. The only examples in the history are Hiroshima and Nagasaki. But that was more than half a century ago. Times have changed now, and no government of a civilized country can now even think of doing so, whatever be the provocation. People of no country will endorse their country dropping atomic bombs on the civilian population of any country.
If all the nuclear weapon states decide not to be the first to use their nuclear weapons, there will not be any use of having a nuclear weapon. The logic of having a nuclear weapon is based on the perceived vulnerability of the countries having it. A country, say X, feels that unless it has a nuclear weapon capacity, it might be open to invasion by another country, say Y, who has a nuclear arsenal. So X starts getting into the business of making the nuclear bombs. This happened in the case of Pakistan. In the wake of first Indian nuclear test explosion in 1974, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the then Pakistani Prime Minister said, “If India builds the bomb we will eat grass or leaves, we will go hungry. But we will get one of our own.” Similarly, India’s nuclear program was initiated after China test-exploded it first atomic bomb in 1964 at Lop Nur. The sad fact of South Asia is that the hostility between China and India on one hand, and India and Pakistan on the other has become an emotional fixation. India feels insecure vis-à-vis China. Hence it needs nuclear weapons. Pakistan feels insecure vis-à-vis India. Hence, it needs nuclear weapons. The political situation between India and Pakistan has been colored by the baggage of Kashmir which both the countries having been carrying since they got independence from the British in 1947. For the similar reasons there falls the shadow of Sino-Indian war of 1962, whenever talks of rapprochement between China and India are held.
Simplistically, China and India should not be afraid of an unprovoked nuclear assault from each other. Both of them are categorically and publicly committed to NFU of their nuclear weapons. Both are respected members of international community and adhere to the norms of International Law. It is highly unlikely they should go back on their commitment. This may appear a naïve view to the cynical. However, there are political reasons why a nuclear exchange between Indian and China is unlikely. China need not attack India with nuclear weapons, as it is much superior to India in terms of conventional military prowess. And India will not make the first nuclear strike against China for the fear of massive retaliation. Then why are India and China wasting their resources in upgrading and developing its nuclear arsenal? In case of India, the answer lies in (a) the ambiguity of the Pakistani nuclear doctrine, and (b) the Pakistan’s neurotic obsession with Kashmir. In case of China, the reason lies its infatuation with the dream of becoming a topmost military power in the world.
In case of the United Kingdom and France, nuclear weapons provide a visible basis for their big power status. Both of these two countries are permanent members of the Security Council of the United Nations and wield veto powers. But for the historical reason that they were the major players in the Second World War, they do not have any raison d’etre of having the status they have. Economically, they are on a less sure footing than Japan and Germany. It is quite possible that their place in a reconstructed scheme of Security Council might be called in question.
The UK and France do not have NFU in their nuclear doctrine.
The UK does not have it because politically it is a wartime and peacetime ally of the United States. To have NFU policy, when the USA does not have it, will be antithetical to its overall alliance with the USA. On February 2, 2003, during the TV program BBC Breakfast with Frost, the British defense secretary Geoff Hoon said, “We've always made it clear that we would reserve the right to use our nuclear weapons in conditions of extreme national self defense and that remains our position and that is the position that has been set out consistently by government ministers.”
France also does not believe in NUF doctrine. It wants to retain its right to use nuclear weapons in unspecified hypothetical situations. On January 19, 2006 speaking at the nuclear submarine base L’ille Longue in Brittany, President Jaques Chirac said that France reserves the right to use non-conventional weapons against “leaders of states who would launch a terrorist attack against France.” The real reason for the French not having NFU doctrine in their nuclear policy is their obsession with what they believe to be their fiercely eminent place in the community of nations.
The Russian nuclear doctrine has gone through many changes. The erstwhile Soviet Union had declared in 1982 the NFU to be the basis of their nuclear doctrine. However, the Russians rejected it in 1993, and in the year 2000 they declared that they reserve the right to use nuclear weapons in response to a large scale conventional aggression. Technically it violates the Security Council’s resolution of 1995 on Security Assurances, because the country launching a large scale invasion may be a non-nuclear weapon country. The recent decision of the USA to position its missile defense shield in Poland is presently a cause of annoyance to the Russian administration. General Anatoly Nogovitsyn said recently that Poland’s acceptance of American missile interceptor base exposes the ex-communist nation to attack, possibly by nuclear weapons. He added that Russia’s military doctrine sanctions the use of nuclear weapons against the allies of countries having nuclear weapons if they in some way help them.
USA, the most heavily armed nuclear weapon state, does not have NFU as a part of its nuclear doctrine. They have commitments to defend their NATO allies, Japan and South Korea. NFU may bind their hands in a number of hypothetical situations, and understandably they will not like to get themselves into a nuclear straitjacket. Their Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations dated 15 March 2005 says that the United States does not make positive statements defining the circumstances under which it would use nuclear weapons. The Cinton administration was non-committal on the question of whether the nuclear weapons would be used to address the problem of chemical and biological warfare, or even using them in case of conventional armed conflicts. But it was tacitly assumed that they would not waste their nuclear assets unless the very existence of American nation came under serious threat.
American view seems to be that nuclear weapons, by themselves, do not pose a problem. Real problem is under whose control they are. Nuclear assets with the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China and India are fine. What is worrisome their being with Pakistan, or (potentially) with fundamentalist regimes like Iran. In order to deal with any situation involving the rogue states using nuclear weapons, the USA does not want to commit itself to NFU.
NFU is an intensely ethical concept. If all the nuclear weapon states agree not to be the first to use their nuclear weapons, it will be a step in the direction of eventual nuclear disarmament. Often it may come in clash with the national interest of a nuclear weapon state which swears by it. In spite of a large number of ifs and buts and hypothetical infirmities NFU will prevent nuclear wars and bring the world closer to nuclear disarmament. It is bound to strengthen the non-proliferation regime. NFU is a very strong political commitment and if all the nuclear weapons states make it an integral element of their nuclear doctrine it will go long way to usher a nuclear-weapon-free world.
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